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Abstract
The connection between contradictory public opinions, heteroge-
neous believes and the emergence of democratic or dictatorial extrem-
ism is studied extending our former two state dynamic opinion model.
Agents are attached to a social-cultural class. At each step they are
distributed randomly in different groups within their respective class
to evolve locally by majority rule. In case of a tie the group adopts
either one opinion with respective probabilities k and (1 − k). The
value of k accounts for the average of individual biases driven by the
existence of heterogeneous believes within the corresponding class. It
may vary from class to class. The process leads to extremism with a
full polarization of each class along either one opinions. For homoge-
neous classes the extremism can be along the initial minority making
it dictatorial. At contrast heterogeneous classes exhibit a more bal-
anced dynamics which results in a democratic extremism. Segregation
among subclasses may produce a coexistence of opinions at the class
level thus averting global extremism. The existence of contradictory
public opinions in similar social-cultural neighborhoods is given a new
light.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey, 05.40.-a, 89.65.-s, 89.75.-k
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1 Introduction
In recent years the study of opinion dynamics has become a main stream of
research in Physics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
Initiated long time ago [18, 19, 20] it is part of Sociophysics [21].
Outside physics, research has concentrated on analyzing the complicated
psycho-sociological mechanisms involved in the process of opinion forming.
In particular focusing on those by which a huge majority of people gives up to
an initial minority view [22, 23]. The main ingredient being, for instance in
the case of a reform proposal, that the prospect to loose definite advantages
is much more energizing than the corresponding gains which by nature are
hypothetical.
Such an approach is certainly realistic in view of the very active nature
of minorities involved in a large spectrum of social situations. However we
have shown [10, 16, 17] that even in the case of non active minorities, pub-
lic opinion obeys some internal threshold dynamics which breaks its demo-
cratic character. Although each agent does have an opinion, they may find
themselves into local unstable doubting collective state while discussing with
others in small groups. In such a case, we postulated that all group mem-
bers adopt the same opinion, the one which is consistent with the common
believes of the group. Examples of such common believes may be substanti-
ated by saying like There is no smoke without a fire or In case of a doubt,
better do nothing. Such a possibility of occurrence of local doubts results in
highly unbalanced conditions for the competition of opinions within a given
population even when each opinion has an identical convincing weight [5, 10].
In the present work we introduce social-cultural classes to include all
agents which may meet together to discuss an eventual public issue. Each
class is characterized by some common believes that result from the class
average of all heterogeneous individual biases. Accordingly, in case of a tie
in a local group, the resulting choice is either one opinion with respective
probabilities k and (1− k) where k accounts for the corresponding common
belief of the social-cultural class. The value of k is constant within each class
with 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 and may vary from class to class.
Considering a class with a common belief k and groups of size 4, O de-
noting an opponent to the issue at stake and S a supporter, our update rules
writes,
SSSS and OSSS → SSSS; OOOO and OOOS → OOOO,
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0 1
50 %
Separator at 65%
Attractor PS  = 0
Attractor PS  = 1
Figure 1: Opinion flow diagram with the two attractors at 0 and 1 and the
separator at a non symmetric value 65%. To survive a public debate one
opinion must start at an initial support of more than fifteen percent while
the other one needs an initial minority support. The associated extremism
is dictatorial.
OOSS →
{ OOOO with probabiliy k
SSSS with probabiliy(1 − k)
,
where all permutations are allowed. In our earlier works k = 1 or k = 0
except in [17] and in an application to cancerous tumor growth [24]. For
0 ≤ k ≤ 1 the opinion flow dynamics still converges towards a full opinion
polarization but the separator location is now a function of k and the group
size distribution. It may vary from 0% to 100% as shown in Fig. 1.
The flow is fast and monotonous. When the initial majority makes the
final opinion, the associated extremism is democratic, otherwise it is more or
less dictatorial depending on the value of the initial minority which eventually
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spreads over the all class. Various extreme social situations can be thus be
described. In case of an homogeneous high risk aversion sharing (k = 0) it is
found that a reform proposal may need an initial support of more than 90%
of the population to survive a public debate [10]. On the opposite, a shared
high prejudice against some ethnic or religious groups (k = 1) can make an
initial false rumor shared by only a few percent of the population to spread
over the whole population [5]. Moreover very small fluctuations in the initial
conditions may lead to opposite extremism.
At contrast heterogeneous populations (k = 1
2
) are found to exhibit a
more balanced dynamics. Extremism is turned democratic. At odd, seg-
regation among subclasses leads opposite extremism within each subclass,
which in turn stabilizes the associated overall class opinion at a permanent
coexistence of both opinions thus averting extremism.
Earlier version of a threshold dynamical process can be found in the
study of voting in democratic hierarchical systems [19, 25]. There, groups
of agents vote for a representative to the higher level using a local majority
rule. Going up the hierarchy turns out to be exactly identical to an opinion
forming process in terms of equations and dynamics. Instead of voting, agents
update their opinions. The probability of electing a representative at some
hierarchy level n is equal to the proportion of opinions sharing an opinion
after n updates [17, 19]. However within all these earlier studies the value of
k is always taken equal to one except in [17] where it was a function of the
ration majority/minority within some finite size neighborhood. The existence
of threshold dynamics in social phenomena was advocated long time ago in
qualitative studies of some social phenomena [26, 27].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is defined in the
next Section. It is then solved exactly within the simple case of groups of size
three in Section 3. The counter intuitive case of groups of size 4 is studied
in Section 4. In Section 5 small fluctuations are shown to sometimes lead
to contradictory public opinions. It sheds a new light on the fact that very
similar areas in terms of their respective believes can hold opposite view,
for instance about the feeling of safety. Segregation effects are studied in
Section 6 to find they can drive either democratic extremism or coexistence
of opinions thus avoiding global extremism. Including a size distribution for
local groups is presented in Section 7. Last section contains some discussion.
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2 Setting the problem
We start partitioning a given population among different social-cultural classes.
Then we consider each class independently to study the dynamics of opinion
forming among its N individual members facing some issue. It may be a
reform proposal, a behavior change like stopping smoking, a foreign policy
decision or the belief in some rumor. The process is held separately within
each class of agents.
We discriminate between two levels in the process of formation of the
global opinion, an external level and an internal one. The first one is the
net result from the global information available to every one, the private
information some persons may have and the influence of mass media. The
second level concerns the internal dynamics driven by people discussing freely
among themselves. Both levels are interpenetrated but here we decoupled
them to study specifically the laws governing the internal dynamics.
Accordingly, choosing a class of agents at a time t prior to the public
debate the issue at stake is given a support by Ns(t) individuals (denoted S)
and an opposition from No(t) agents (denoted O). Each person is supposed to
have an opinion with Ns(t) +No(t) = N . Associated individual probabilities
to be in favor or against the proposal at time t are,
ps,o(t) ≡ Ns,o(t)
N
, (1)
with,
ps(t) + po(t) = 1. (2)
From this initial configuration, people start discussing the project. How-
ever they don’t meet all the time and all together at once. Gatherings
are shaped by the geometry of social life within physical spaces like offices,
houses, bars, restaurants and others. This geometry determines the number
of people, which meet at a given place. Usually it is of the order of just a
few. Groups may be larger but in these cases spontaneous splitting always
occurs with people discussing in smaller subgroups.
To emphasize the mechanism at work in the dynamics which arises from
local interactions no advantage is given to the minority with neither lobbying
nor organized strategy. People discuss in small groups. To implement the
psychological process of collective mind driven update, a local majority rule
is used within each group. Moreover an identical individual persuasive power
is assumed for both sides with the principle “one person - one argument”.
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On this basis all members of a group adopt the opinion which had the initial
majority. In case there exists no majority, i.e. at a tie in a group of even size,
all members yet adopt the same opinion, but now either one with respective
probabilities k and (1− k) where k is a function of the class.
3 The intuitive case: the group of size three
We first consider the case of update groups with the same size three. Ac-
cordingly to our local majority rule groups with either 3 S or 2 S ends up
with 3 S. Otherwise it is 3 O. The probability to find one supporter S after
n successive updates is,
ps(t + n) = ps(t+ n− 1)3 + 3ps(t+ n− 1)2(1− ps(t+ n− 1)) , (3)
where ps(t+ n− 1) is the proportion of supporters S at a distance of (n− 1)
updates from the initial time t.
Eq. (3) exhibits 3 fixed points ps,0 = 0, ps,1 = 1. and pc,3 =
1
2
. First
two corresponds to a total opinion polarization along respectively a total
opposition to the issue with zero supporters left and a total support. Both
are attractors of the dynamics. The last point with a perfectly balanced
opinion splitting is the separator of the dynamics as shown in Figs. (2) and
(3).
To reach the attractor, the dynamics requires a sufficient number of up-
dates. In solid terms each update means some real time measured in numbers
of days whose evaluation is out the scope of the present work. An illustra-
tion is given starting from ps(t) = 0.45. We get successively ps(t+1) = 0.42,
ps(t + 2) = 0.39, ps(t + 3) = 0.34, ps(t + 4) = 0.26, ps(t + 5) = 0.17,
ps(t + 6) = 0.08 down to ps(t + 7) = 0.02 and ps(t + 8) = 0.00. Within 8
successive updates, 45% of the agents who were supporting the issue have
shifted against it. The process has preserved and reinforced the initial ma-
jority making democratic the resulting extremism.The dynamics is perfectly
symmetric with respect to both opinions as seen from Figs. (2) and (3). It
is worth to stress that here the social-cultural character of the class is not
activated since a local majority is always found.
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 P+ at time t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P+ at time t+1
Separator
Extremism in favor
Extremism
against
Figure 2: Variation of the proportion ps(t + 1) of supporters as function of
ps(t) for groups of size 3. Arrows show the direction of the flow for an initial
support ps(t) < pc,3 =
1
2
. The extremism is democratic.
4 The counter intuitive case: the group of
size four
It is only when dealing with even groups that the common believes driven
bias can be analyzed. There, the “one person - one argument” rule allows
for the possibility of a tie with no local majority. In such a case participants
are in a non-decisional state. They are doubting collectively, both opinions
being supported by an equal number of arguments. Here we evoke a common
belief “inertia principle” to lift the doubt. We state that at a tie the group
eventually adopts the opinion O with a probability k and the opinion S with
the probability (1− k) where k accounts for the collective bias produced by
the common believes of the group members. Some specific situations are
considered below.
To illustrate the model we consider groups of size 4. The probability to
find one supporter S after n successive updates becomes,
ps(t + n) = ps(t + n− 1)4 + 4ps(t+ n− 1)3{1− ps(t+ n− 1)}
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2 4 6 8 10 12 Updates
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PS
PS=0.48
PS=0.52
PS=0.50
Figure 3: Variation of ps(t) for groups of size 3 as function of repeated
updates with three initial support ps(t) = 0.48, 0.50, 0.52. The resulting
extremism is democratic since it is along the initial majority.
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Bias k
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pc for size 4
PS=0.4 at t
PS=1 at t+n
PS=0 at t+n
Risk aversion k=1
Novelty attraction k=0
Figure 4: Variation of pc,4 as function of k. For a collective risk aversion (k =
1), pc,4 ≈ 0.77 while for a collective novelty attraction (k = 0), pc,4 ≈ 0.23.
In case of no collective bias (k = 1
2
), pc,4 =
1
2
. An initial support of ps = 0.40
is shown to lead to a an extremism in favor (pS = 1) for the range of bias
0 ≤ k ≤ 0.36. At contrast the extremism is against (pS = 0) for the whole
range 0.36 ≤ k ≤ 1.
+6(1− k)ps(t+ n− 1)2{1− ps(t+ n− 1)2 , (4)
where ps(t + n − 1) is the proportion of supporters at a distance of (n − 1)
updates from initial time t. Last term includes the tie case contribution
(2S-2O) weighted with the probability k.
From Eq. (4) both attractors ps,0 = 0 and ps,1 = 1 are recovered. However
the unstable fixed point pc,4 has now departed from the symmetric value
1
2
to the non-symmetric value,
pc,4 =
(6k − 5) +√13− 36k + 36k2
6(2k − 1) , (5)
except at k = 1
2
where pc,4 =
1
2
. Fig. (4) shows the variation of pc,4 as a
function of k. The effect of the common believes of the class in the formation
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Figure 5: Variation of ps(t+ 1) as function of ps(t) for groups of size 4. On
the left side k = 1 making pc,3 ≈ 0.77. Arrows show the direction of the
flow for an initial support ps(t) < 0.77. On the right side k = 0 making
pc,3 ≈ 0.23. Arrows show the direction of the flow for an initial support
ps(t) > 0.23.
of the associated public opinion is seen explicitly. For instance, an initial
support of ps = 0.40 leads to a an extremism in favor the issue at stake for
the whole range of bias 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.36. At contrast the extremism is against
it when 0.36 ≤ k ≤ 1.
For instance, when the issue relates to some reform proposal and the class
shares a high risk aversion, a tie supports the Status Quo, i.e., k = 1 which
yields pc,4 ≈ 0.77. The initial support for the reform to make the final public
opinion has thus to start with more than 77% as shown in Figs. (5) and (6)).
When it does, the corresponding extremism is democratic.
On the other hand, an issue within a context where novelty is preferred
drives a non-decisional state to adopt the opinion S making k = 0 with in
turn pc,4 ≈ 0.23. An initial support of more than 23% is now sufficient to
invade the whole population. In case it happens, the resulting extremism is
dictatorial since it is along an initial minority view. Associated flow dynamics
are shown on the right side of Figs. (5-6).
In the case of groups of size 4 the number of updates to reach a full
polarization is smaller than is the case of size 3 as shown in Fig. (7) at k = 1
and k = 0. The number of required updates to have an extremism completed
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2 4 6 8 10 12 Updates
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PS
PS=0.79
PS=0.77
PS=0.75
2 4 6 8 10 12 Updates
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PS
PS=0.25
PS=0.23
PS=0.21
Figure 6: Variation of ps(t) for groups of side 4 as function of repeated up-
dates. On the left size k = 1 with three initial support ps(t) = 0.75, 0.77, 0.79.
To make the extremism, the initial support has to be larger than 77%. When
it happens it is democratic . On the right side k = 0 with three initial sup-
port ps(t) = 0.21, 0.23, 0.25. The resulting extremism is dictatorial when it
corresponds to an initial minority.
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can be evaluated as,
n ≃ 1
ln[λ]
ln[
pc − pS
pc − p+(t) ], (6)
where λ is the first derivative of ps(t + 1) with respect to ps(t) taken at
ps(t) = pc. Moreover pS = 0 if p+(t) < pc while pS = 1 when p+(t) > pc.
The number of updates being an integer, its value is obtained from Eq.
(7) rounding to an integer. The number of updates diverges at pc. The
situation is symmetric with respect to k = 0 and k = 1 with the divergence
at respectively pc = 0.23 and pc = 0.77. It occurs at pc = 0.50 for k = 3.
For instance, starting as above with groups of size 3 from ps(t) = 0.45 we
get with k = 1 the series ps(t+1) = 0.24, ps(t+2) = 0.05 and ps(t+3) = 0.00.
Within 3 successive updates 45% of support has shifted their support to an
opposition. Even an initial support above 50% with ps(t) = 0.70 yields
ps(t + 1) = 0.66, ps(t + 2) = 0.57, ps(t + 3) = 0.42, ps(t + 4) = 0.20,
ps(t + 5) = 0.03, and ps(t + 6) = 0.00. Only 6 updates are enough to have
70% of supporters to shift their opinion.
5 Small fluctuations and contradictory public
opinions in similar areas
We now discuss the effect of small differences of shared believes in the making
of public opinion of neighboring groups. For instance we consider a city
area and its suburb as shown in Fig. (8). One class covers the city with
k = 0.49 and another one the suburb with = 0.47. Such a minor difference
is not explicitly felt while crossing from one area to another. Both area are
perceived as identical. However the study of the dynamics of opinion starting
from the same initial conditions within each area shows that sometimes huge
differences can be driven by either minor differences in the initial conditions.
To illustrate our statement we consider two very similar initial condi-
tions with an issue at stake having respectively 49% and 51% of support
among both city and suburb populations. We then follow the dynamics of
the corresponding public opinion flows.
In the first case, 51% of support to the issue results in both populations to
a full support to the issue making both geographical areas identical as seen
in Fig. (9). The process is completed within an estimate of ten updates.
However a tiny decrease of 2% in the initial support down at 49% split the
12
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Initial PS
10
20
30
40
Updates
Group size 4 with k=1
Group size 3
Group size 4 with k=0
Figure 7: Variation of the number of required updates to reach full extremism
for groups of size 3 and 4 at k = 0.
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k=0.49
k=0.47
Figure 8: A city with k = 0.49 and its surrounding suburb with k = 0.47.
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2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5 15 Updates
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PS
PS=0.49
PS=0.51 k=0.47
k=0.49
Figure 9: Evolution of ps(t) as function of the updates for groups of size
4 with k = 0.49 and k = 0.47. Two initial supports are considered. For
ps = 0.51 both k = 0.49 and k = 0.47 leads to pS = 1. But for ps = 0.49
only k = 0.47 leads to pS = 1 while k = 0.49 leads to pS = 0.
two neighboring similar areas. The city is now fully opposed to the issue
while the suburb stays unchanged with a full support to it (see Fig. (9)).
Above case may shed a new light on situations in which contradictory
feelings or opinions are sustained in areas which are nevertheless very similar
like for instance the feeling of safety. It shows how an insignificant change
in either the initial support or the bias driven by the common believes, may
yield drastic differences in the outcome of public opinion. Fig. (10) shows the
variations of the number of updates needed to reach extremism for several
values of the bias k. Here too, the same initial support is shown to lead
to totally different outcomes as function of k. A value pS = 0.30 leads to
pS = 0 for both k = 0.50 and k = 0.70 while it yields pS = 1 for k = 0.10.
For pS = 0.70 all 3 cases lead to pS = 1.
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5
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Number of updates
k=0.1
k=0.5
k=0.7
o
o
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o
Figure 10: Number of required updates to reach extremism for several values
of the local bias with k = 0.10 k = 0.50 and k = 0.70. Associated values are
shown for an initial support of respectively 30% and 70%
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6 Segregation, democratic extremism and co-
existence
Up to now we have considered at a tie an average local bias k which results
form a distribution of heterogeneous believes within a population. It means
that all members of that population do mix together during the local group
updates whatever is the individual respective believes. At this stage it is
worth to note that different situations may arise in the distribution of the
individual ki.
We discuss two cases for which either all ki are equal, i.e. an homogeneous
population or they are all distributed among two extreme values for instance
0 and 1. There the existence of subclasses as a result of individual segregation
may turn instrumental in producing drastic changes in the final global public
opinion of the corresponding class.
Consider first two different homogeneous classes A and B in two different
areas with respectively ki = 0 for all i in A and kj = 1 for all j in B. From Eqs.
(5-6) an initial support ps = 0.25 yields pS = 1 for A and pS = 0 for B as seen
in Fig. (11). For A the extremism in support of the issue is dictatorial since
along the initial minority ps = 0.25. At odd, in B the extremism is against
the issue and democratic since along the initial majority of 1 − ps = 0.75
against it.
Now consider above classes A and B but as subclasses of the same class
within one unique area. Two situations may occur as illustrated in Fig.
(12) where A individuals are represented by circles and B ones by squares.
They are white when in favor and black if against. In the first situation
(higher part of the Figure) people from each subclass do not mix together
while updating their individual opinions. They are segregating each other
yet sharing the same class within the same geographical area. As a result
two opposite extremism for each subclass is obtained as above. However the
novelty with respect to distinct geographical areas is that here the resulting
public opinion of the global class which does include the whole population
is no longer exhibiting any extremism. The dynamics of segregated updates
of opinions has produced a stable coexistence of both initial opinions with
thus a balance collective stand. A poll over the bias would reveal the average
value k = 1/2.
In the second situation (lower part of the Figure) people from each sub-
class do mix together while updating their individual opinions. As a result,
17
2 4 6 8 10 Updates
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PS
k=0
k=1
k=0.5-coexistence
k=0.5-democratic
Figure 11: The dynamic of public opinions for two populations on different
areas with respectively k = 0 and k = 1 at an initial support of ps = 0.25
is shown on the upper and lower curves. In between the two populations
are in the same area as subclasses of one unique class. The upper one has
segregation and yields a coexistence of opinions. The lower one has mixing
and reveals a democratic extremism.
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at a tie with mix individuals, A people adopt the opinion in favor while B
people go on against. With two sub-populations with more or less the same
large enough size this process is equivalent on average to have a bias k = 1/2.
The resulting extremism is democratic since it is along the initial global ma-
jority among the whole population. Mixing or segregation within the same
situation may thus lead to drastically different public opinions as illustrated
in Fig. (12).
7 Group size distribution
Most of our analysis dealt with groups of size four. In real life people meet and
discuss in several group sizes, from two up to five, six. Such a generalization
was treated in [10] in the case k = 1. Along the same line we can define the
general update Equation,
ps(t+ n) =
L∑
i=1
ai{
i∑
j=N [ i
2
+1]
C ijps(t + n− 1)jpo(t + n− 1)(i−j) (7)
+(1− ki)V (i)C ii
2
ps(t+ n− 1) i2po(t+ n− 1) i2},
where C ij ≡ i!(i−j)!j! , N [ i2 + 1] ≡ Integer Part of ( i2 + 1), ps(t + n − 1) is the
proportion of supporters after (n− 1) updates and V (i) ≡ N [ i
2
]−N [ i−1
2
]. It
gives V (i) = 1 for i even and V (i) = 0 for i odd. We also have introduced
the possibility of having the local bias ki to a function of the size i of the
group. Simultaneously, we have for the proportion of opponents, po(t+n) =
1− ps(t + n). The proportion of groups of size is defined by the probability
distribution ai with the constraint
∑L
i=1 ai = 1 where L is the largest group
size and i refers to the group size.
Clearly an infinite number of size distribution {ai} is possible. Also vari-
ous value of k can be considered depending on the size group as well as some
agent dependence though the mixing of difference sub-classes. However the
existence of local collective non-decisional state monitored by the occurrence
of local ties in groups of even size will always occur. Such a feature whatever
its amplitude is does produce an asymmetry in the polarization dynamics
towards either one of the two competing opinions thus preserving the main
result of the simple version of the model presented in this paper.
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Figure 12: A population composed from two subclasses sharing opposite
believes. The circles have k = 0 while the squares have k = 1. The ini-
tial proportion in favor (white) is identical for both of them at ps = 0.25.
Black color expressed an opinion against. In the upper series, peoples seg-
regate while updating their opinions. The result is a perfect balance of the
global public opinion with all circles against (blacks) and all squares in favor
(whites). At contrast, in the lower series, circles and squares do mix together
while updating. The result is a democratic extremism with all circles and
squares in favor (white).
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8 Conclusion
To conclude, we have presented a simple model which is able to reproduce
some complexity of the social reality. It suggests that the direction of the
inherent polarization effect in the formation of a public opinion driven by a
democratic debate is biased from the existence of common believes within
a population. Homogeneous versus heterogeneous situations were shown to
result in different qualitative outcomes.
At this stage we did not address the difficult question on how to remedy
this reversal opinion phenomenon with the natural establishment of dictato-
rial extremism. The first hint could be in avoiding the activation of common
general background in the social representation of reality. However direct
and immediate votes could be also rather misleading. Holding an immediate
vote without a debate as soon as a new issue arises has other drawbacks.
At this stage, the collaboration with psycho sociologists as well as political
scientists would be welcome.
In addition, in real life not every person is open mind and changes opinion.
Therefore it would be interesting to introduce stubborn agents in the model.
The model may generalize to a large spectrum of social, economical and
political phenomena that involve propagation effects. In particular it could
shed a new light on both processes of fear propagation and rumors spreading.
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